Were thinking about Covid-19 the wrong way. Its not a wave – its a wildfire – The Guardian

We have no previous experience with a worldwide coronavirus pandemic, so when Sars-CoV-2, the infection that causes Covid-19, began spreading, public health experts leaned on our experiences with influenza pandemics to notify their predictions. These pandemics are typically described in regards to “waves” and “troughs”. We have now seen enough to replace the ocean example with a much better one: wildfire.

We have no previous experience with a worldwide coronavirus pandemic, so when Sars-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, started spreading, public health professionals leaned on our experiences with influenza pandemics to inform their predictions. These pandemics are typically explained in terms of “waves” and “troughs”. Studies of previous pandemics, wars and other times of extreme national tension show that individuals react most calmly and effectively when leadership informs them the truth, even if that truth is frightening. Far, the United States has actually mostly seen the opposite approach: moving-target messaging that is often scientifically erroneous, irrationally optimistic and leaves the public in desperate confusion over who and what to think, with science the very first casualty. It will for that reason fall to them to decide whether to keep the status quo and enjoy the number of cases continue to explode, or administer the more aggressive public health steps needed to not just deal with cases but prevent spread.

Like a wildfire, the virus relentlessly looks for out fuel (human hosts), devastating some locations while sparing others. It will continue spreading out until we achieve adequate herd resistance– when 50 to 70% of the population has developed protective antibodies– to substantially slow transmission.
We now have compelling evidence that Sars-CoV-2 is not impacted by seasonality or local weather; it spreads out by the human contact and blending that takes place in locations of high population density. We do not yet know whether immunity is short-term or long-term. We likewise dont know if a vaccine, if and when we develop one, will be a bulls- eye success like the vaccines for polio or measles, or more of a hope-for-the-best representative like seasonal influenza vaccine. We hope vaccine advancement efforts will prove efficient, however hope is not a method. Like HIV, Sars-Cov-2 is here to remain, and realism needs to notify our strategic reaction
Like HIV, Sars-Cov-2 is here to remain, and realism needs to inform our tactical response.
Research studies of previous pandemics, wars and other times of intense nationwide stress reveal that individuals respond most calmly and effectively when management tells them the truth, even if that truth is frightening. If you dont have responses, say so; tell the general public what youre doing to find out more. So far, the United States has actually mostly seen the opposite method: moving-target messaging that is frequently clinically incorrect, crazily optimistic and leaves the public in desperate confusion over who and what to believe, with science the first casualty. We must focus our message on clinical facts.
While a complete, Wuhan-style lockdown is not practical, we need to get as close as we can in hotspots of precariously increasing case counts, suspending all but strictly necessary services, to get transmission down to a workable level. Areas that observed tight shelter-in-place constraints, like New York and some countries in Asia and Europe, revealed that we can bring the lethal numbers down and bring back the economy in a much safer public environment.
Sadly, the United States has actually often been far too positive and cavalier: at the first signs of effectiveness versus Covid-19, we concluded and breathed out that we were “over the bulge”, even when the case count went beyond 20,000 a day. We informed ourselves that the curve had actually been flattened and company as typical might resume. The grim statistics, nevertheless, speak for themselves.
We must bring the infection rate down to a level where testing outcomes are rapid enough that follow-up tracing can actually determine contacts in time to stop further transmission. Since the infection made landfall we have actually stopped working to do so. The level we need to reach is around 2 Sars-Cov-2 cases a day for each 100,000 population in an area. Were no place near that right now, and the most pressing question ought to be what we need to do to change that. If we dont have the fortitude and cumulative will to sustain the level and undertake of shutdown that will be needed in big parts of the US, along with the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively when and where the infection flares, the variety of brand-new cases and deaths could be incredible, far beyond what we have actually experienced so far.
We do not anticipate this to be set up on a nationwide level by the existing management. Guvs on the frontlines comprehend the financial, social and political crises this virus is triggering, not least the illness and deaths. It will for that reason be up to them to choose whether to keep the status quo and see the variety of cases continue to take off, or administer the more aggressive public health steps required to not only treat cases but avoid spread.
The US has traditionally been a leader in public health and public health, and now we need to look to the example of nations such as South Korea and Singapore and particular EU nations, as well as states like New York, which recognized the challenge earlier; supplied sincere, effective leadership; and quickly undertook screening, contract and mitigation tracing.
We understand that tactical lockdown causes terrific financial and social discomfort, and we need to be prepared to continue looking after those who suffer as a result, whatever the cost. There are no easy or sure-fire responses, and even nations that were at first successful in containment are facing restored spread as their economies resume.
However of one thing we can be particular: the expense of not acting will far surpass the cost of our second chance to get this right. And we might not have the high-end of a 3rd.